Bernardo Vasconcelos 29/8 - bernardovasconcelos@gmail.com
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III.1
 
Natureza é princípio de movimento
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1
Ἐπεὶ δ’ ἡ φύσις μέν ἐστιν ἀρχὴ κινήσεως καὶ μεταβολῆς,
200b, 12 Since nature is a source of motion and of change,
 
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1.1
ἡ δὲ μέθοδος ἡμῖν περὶ φύσεώς ἐστι,
and our pursuit is for nature,
É preciso não ignorar o tema do movimento
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1.2
δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν τί ἐστι κίνησις·
we must not let what motion is remain hidden.
 
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ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ ἀγνοουμένης αὐτῆς (200b15) ἀγνοεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν φύσιν.
For it is necessary, being ignorant of it, to be ignorant also of nature.
Discernindo o movimento, é necessário fazer o mesmo com os temas que se seguem.
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1.3
διορισαμένοις δὲ περὶ κινήσεως πειρατέον τὸν αὐτὸν ἐπελθεῖν τρόπον περὶ τῶν ἐφεξῆς.
And once we have drawn a boundary around motion, we must try in the same way to advance upon the things that follow in succession.
 
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δοκεῖ δ’ ἡ κίνησις εἶναι τῶν συνεχῶν, τὸ δ’ ἄπειρον ἐμφαίνεται πρῶτον ἐν τῷ συνεχεῖ·
Now motion seems to be one of the continuous things, and the infinite comes to sight first in the continuous;
 
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(←) διὸ καὶ τοῖς ὁριζομένοις τὸ συνεχὲς συμβαίνει προσχρήσασθαι πολλάκις τῷ λόγῳ τῷ τοῦ ἀπείρου, (200b.20) ὡς τὸ εἰς ἄπειρον διαιρετὸν συνεχὲς ὄν.
and for this reason, it often falls to those who define the continuous to need also an articulation of the infinite, on the grounds that the continuous is that which 20 is divisible infinitely.
 
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(→) πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἄνευ τόπου καὶ κενοῦ καὶ χρόνου κίνησιν ἀδύνατον εἶναι.
Besides these things, motion seems to be impossible without place and void and time.
 
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δῆλον οὖν ὡς
 
 
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διά τε ταῦτα,
Both for these reasons, then,
 
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καὶ διὰ τὸ πάντων εἶναι κοινὰ καὶ καθόλου ταῦτα,
and because these things named are also generally common to all things,
 
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σκεπτέον προχειρισαμένοις περὶ ἑκάστου τούτων
we must inquire by taking each of them in hand
 
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(ὑστέρα γὰρ ἡ περὶ τῶν ἰδίων θεωρία τῆς περὶ τῶν (200b.25) κοινῶν ἐστιν)·
(for insight into particular things is later than that into those that are common).
Movimento e a dispersão categorial do ente
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2
καὶ πρῶτον, καθάπερ εἴπαμεν, περὶ κινήσεως.
And first, as we said, we must take up motion.
O entes são a. puro ato ou b. ato e potência (entes compostos). Estes últimos (b.) são ditos de acordo com as categorias do ente (subjacente, quantidade, qualidade, posição, κτλ.)
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2.1
ἔστι δὴ [τι] τὸ μὲν ἐντελεχείᾳ μόνον, τὸ δὲ δυνάμει καὶ ἐντελεχείᾳ, τὸ μὲν τόδε τι, τὸ δὲ τοσόνδε, τὸ δὲ τοιόνδε, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοῦ ὄντος κατηγοριῶν ὁμοίως.
There is that which is fully and actively itself, but also that which is what it is, in part, only potentially: either being a this, being this much, being of this kind, or similarly with the 30 other ways of attributing being.
A categoria da relação
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τοῦ δὲ πρός τι τὸ μὲν καθ' ὑπεροχὴν λέγεται καὶ κατ' ἔλλειψιν, τὸ δὲ 200b.30 κατὰ τὸ ποιητικὸν καὶ παθητικόν, καὶ ὅλως κινητικόν τε καὶ κινητόν·
Being in relation to something is attributed to what exceeds or falls short, or to what acts and what is acted upon, or generally to what moves (something) and what is moved:
 
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τὸ γὰρ κινητικὸν κινητικὸν τοῦ κινητοῦ καὶ τὸ κινητὸν κινητὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ κινητικοῦ.
for what moves is a mover of something moved, and what is moved is moved by something moving it,
Não há movimento à parte das categorias do ente
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οὐκ ἔστι δὲ κίνησις παρὰ τὰ πράγματα·
and there is no motion apart from things.
 
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μεταβάλλει γὰρ ἀεὶ τὸ μεταβάλλον ἢ κατ' οὐσίαν ἢ κατὰ ποσὸν ἢ κατὰ ποιὸν ἢ κατὰ τόπον,
For what changes always changes either in thinghood, or in amount, or in quality, or in place,
Nem nada em comum entre os diferentes tipos de movimento à parte de remeterem a uma mesma categoria.
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200b.35 κοινὸν δ' ἐπὶ τούτων οὐδὲν ἔστι λαβεῖν, ὡς φαμέν, ὃ οὔτε τόδε οὔτε (201a.1) ποσὸν οὔτε ποιὸν οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων κατηγορημάτων οὐθέν·
and there is nothing to take hold of which is common to these, and is neither, in our manner of 201a speaking, a this, nor a this much, nor an of-this-kind, nor any of the other kinds of being:
Não há ser ou movimento à parte do que foi dito
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ὥστ' οὐδὲ κίνησις οὐδὲ μεταβολὴ οὐθενὸς ἔσται παρὰ τὰ εἰρημένα, μηθενός γε ὄντος παρὰ τὰ εἰρημένα.
so that neither motion nor change will be anything apart from the things named, since there is, in fact, nothing other than the things named.
Cada categoria do ente se diz ainda duplamente, a partir de diferentes pares de opostos. Forma e privação (um isso), negro e branco (qualidade), completo e incompleto (quantidade), κτλ.
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2.2
(201a.4) ἕκαστον δὲ διχῶς ὑπάρχει πᾶσιν, οἷον τὸ τόδε (τὸ μὲν γὰρ μορφὴ αὐτοῦ, τὸ δὲ στέρησις), καὶ κατὰ τὸ ποιόν (τὸ μὲν γὰρ λευκὸν τὸ δὲ μέλαν), καὶ κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν τὸ μὲν τέλειον τὸ δ' ἀτελές. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὴν φορὰν τὸ μὲν ἄνω τὸ δὲ κάτω, ἢ τὸ μὲν κοῦφον τὸ δὲ βαρύ. ὥστε κινήσεως καὶ μεταβολῆς ἔστιν εἴδη τοσαῦτα ὅσα τοῦ ὄντος.
Now each of these may belong to anything in two ways: a this may be a form or its deprivation, an of-this-kind either (say) white or black, or a this-much either complete or incomplete. In the same way, then, also, a change of place may be either up or down, of something either light or heavy. Therefore, there are just so many kinds of motion and of change as there are of being.
Tendo discernido ato e potência com relação às diferentes categorias, afirmamos que o movimento é o ato de uma potência, enquanto ainda é em potência ou, em outras palavras, é o estar em funcionamento de uma potência enquanto tal, em direção a um fim, mas sem ainda alcança-lo
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2.3
(201a.10) διῃρημένου δὲ καθ' ἕκαστον γένος τοῦ μὲν ἐντελεχείᾳ τοῦ δὲ δυνάμει, ἡ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος ἐντελέχεια, ᾗ τοιοῦτον, κίνησίς ἐστιν, οἷον τοῦ μὲν ἀλλοιωτοῦ, ᾗ ἀλλοιωτόν, ἀλλοίωσις, τοῦ δὲ αὐξητοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀντικειμένου φθιτοῦ (οὐδὲν γὰρ ὄνομα κοινὸν ἐπ' ἀμφοῖν) αὔξησις καὶ φθίσις, τοῦ δὲ γενητοῦ καὶ φθαρτοῦ γένεσις καὶ (201a.15) φθορά, τοῦ δὲ φορητοῦ φορά.
10 A distinction having been made in each kind of being between the fully active and what is only potentially, the being-at-work-staying-itself of whatever is potentially, just as such, is motion: of the alterable, as alterable, it is alteration, of what can grow and its opposite, what can shrink (since no name is common to the two), it is growth and shrinkage, of the generable and destructible it is coming-to-be and passing away, and of the movable in place it is change of place.
Argumentos adicionais para a tese
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ὅτι δὲ τοῦτο ἔστιν ἡ κίνησις, ἐντεῦθεν δῆλον. ὅταν γὰρ τὸ οἰκοδομητόν, ᾗ τοιοῦτον αὐτὸ λέγομεν εἶναι, ἐντελεχείᾳ ᾖ, οἰκοδομεῖται, καὶ ἔστιν τοῦτο οἰκοδόμησις· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ μάθησις καὶ ἰάτρευσις καὶ κύλισις καὶ ἅλσις καὶ ἅδρυνσις καὶ γήρανσις.
That this is motion is clear from this: when the buildable, just insofar as it is said to be such, is fully at-work, [namely at-work-staying-buildable,] it is being built, and this is the activity of building. A similar formulation applies to the activities of learning, healing, 20 rolling, leaping, ripening, and aging.
 
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ἐπεὶ δ' ἔνια (201a.20) ταὐτὰ καὶ δυνάμει καὶ ἐντελεχείᾳ ἐστίν, οὐχ ἅμα δὲ ἢ οὐ κατὰ τὸ αὐτό, ἀλλ' οἷον θερμὸν μὲν ἐντελεχείᾳ ψυχρὸν δὲ δυνάμει, πολλὰ ἤδη ποιήσει καὶ πείσεται ὑπ' ἀλλήλων· ἅπαν γὰρ ἔσται ἅμα ποιητικὸν καὶ παθητικόν. ὥστε καὶ τὸ κινοῦν φυσικῶς κινητόν· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτον κινεῖ (201a.25) κινούμενον καὶ αὐτό.
And since some of the same things are both potentially and in full activity, though not at the same time and in the same respect, but for example actively hot and potentially cold, many things will at once be both acting and being acted upon by each other, for all will at the same time be both active and passive. Thus what causes motion in a natural way is also moved, for each such thing moves both the moved and itself.
 
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δοκεῖ μὲν οὖν τισιν ἅπαν κινεῖσθαι τὸ κινοῦν, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ περὶ τούτου μὲν ἐξ ἄλλων ἔσται δῆλον ὅπως ἔχει (ἔστι γάρ τι κινοῦν καὶ ἀκίνητον),
To some, indeed, it seems that everything that causes motion is moved, but how this truly stands will be clear from other considerations (for there is something causing motion and motionless).
Qualificações quanto à definição
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2.4
ἡ δὲ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος <ἐντελέχεια>, ὅταν ἐντελεχείᾳ ὂν ἐνεργῇ οὐχ ᾗ αὐτὸ ἀλλ' ᾗ κινητόν, κίνησίς ἐστιν.
But the being-at-work staying-itself of what is potentially, whenever, being fully at work, it is at work not as itself but just as movable, is motion. 30
As potências de ser bronze e de ser estátua são distintas: o estar em funcionamento de uma potência enquanto matéria é sua forma (e.g. o bronze); o estar em funcionamento de uma potência enquanto potência é movimento
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λέγω δὲ τὸ ᾗ ὡδί. ἔστι γὰρ ὁ (201a.30) χαλκὸς δυνάμει ἀνδριάς, ἀλλ' ὅμως οὐχ ἡ τοῦ χαλκοῦ ἐντελέχεια, ᾗ χαλκός, κίνησίς ἐστιν· οὐ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ τὸ χαλκῷ εἶναι καὶ δυνάμει τινί [κινητῷ], ἐπεὶ εἰ ταὐτὸν ἦν ἁπλῶς καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον, ἦν ἂν ἡ τοῦ χαλκοῦ, ᾗ χαλκός, ἐντελέχεια κίνησις· οὐκ ἔστιν δὲ ταὐτόν, ὡς εἴρηται
By the "just as" I mean this. Bronze is potentially a statue, but it is not the being-at-work-staying-itself of bronze as bronze that is motion; for the being-bronze itself is not the being-potentially-something, since, if they were simply the same and meant the same thing, the being-at-work-staying itself of the bronze as bronze would be motion. But they are not the same, as was said.
Assim como potencialmente saudável e potencialmente doente são duas potências distintas com um mesmo subjacente.
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(δῆλον δ' (201a.35) ἐπὶ τῶν ἐναντίων· τὸ μὲν γὰρ δύνασθαι ὑγιαίνειν καὶ (201b.1) δύνασθαι κάμνειν ἕτερον – καὶ γὰρ ἂν τὸ κάμνειν καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν ταὐτὸν ἦν – τὸ δὲ ὑποκείμενον καὶ τὸ ὑγιαῖνον καὶ τὸ νοσοῦν, εἴθ' ὑγρότης εἴθ' αἷμα, ταὐτὸν καὶ ἕν).
(This is clear in the case of contraries. For to be potentially healthy 201b and to be potentially sick are different. If they were not, to be sick and to be healthy would be the same. But the subject underlying both the health and the sickness, whether blood or some other fluid, is the same and one.)
Cor é aquilo que enxergamos, mas ser visível não é o mesmo que ter uma determinada cor (pois a visibilidade depende de fatores externos, como a luz)
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ἐπεὶ δ' οὐ ταὐτόν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ χρῶμα ταὐτὸν καὶ ὁρατόν, ἡ τοῦ δυνατοῦ, (201b.5) ᾗ δυνατόν, ἐντελέχεια φανερὸν ὅτι κίνησίς ἐστιν.
Since then they are not the same, just as neither are a color and being-capable-of-being-seen the same, it is clear that the being-at-work-staying-itself of a potency, as a potency, is motion.
E o movimento dura apenas enquanto isso durar, ele não existe nem antes nem depois
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ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστιν αὕτη, καὶ ὅτι συμβαίνει τότε κινεῖσθαι ὅταν ἡ ἐντελέχεια ᾖ αὐτή, καὶ οὔτε πρότερον οὔτε ὕστερον, δῆλον· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ ἕκαστον ὁτὲ μὲν ἐνεργεῖν ὁτὲ δὲ μή,
It is clear both that this is motion, and that a thing happens to be moved whenever this being-at-work-staying-itself is, and neither before nor after. For each thing admits at one time of being active, at another of not being active.
E.g. o que pode ser construído está em movimento na medida em que é construído, mas nem antes de iniciar a construção e nem depois de ela ser finalizada
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οἷον τὸ οἰκοδομητόν, καὶ ἡ τοῦ οἰκοδομητοῦ ἐνέργεια, ᾗ οἰκοδομητόν, (201b.10) οἰκοδόμησίς ἐστιν (ἢ γὰρ οἰκοδόμησις ἡ ἐνέργεια [τοῦ οἰκοδομητοῦ] ἢ ἡ οἰκία· ἀλλ' ὅταν οἰκία ᾖ, οὐκέτ' οἰκοδομητὸν ἔστιν· οἰκοδομεῖται δὲ τὸ οἰκοδομητόν· ἀνάγκη οὖν οἰκοδόμησιν τὴν ἐνέργειαν εἶναι)· ἡ δ' οἰκοδόμησις κίνησίς τις. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ αὐτὸς ἐφαρμόσει λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων (201b.15) κινήσεων.
An example is the buildable. The being at work of 10 the buildable, just as buildable, is building. (For the being-at-work must be either building or the house. But whenever the house is, the buildable is no longer. But it is the buildable that is being built. Necessarily then, building is the being-at-work.) But building is a certain motion. And surely the same account will exactly fit the other motions.
 
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III.2
 
Argumentos adicionais para a definição de movimento
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1
Ὅτι δὲ καλῶς εἴρηται, δῆλον καὶ ἐξ ὧν οἱ ἄλλοι περὶ αὐτῆς λέγουσιν, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ῥᾴδιον εἶναι διορίσαι ἄλλως αὐτήν.
That this has been stated well is confirmed both by the things others have said about it and by the fact that it is not easy to define it otherwise.
Muitos associam o movimento a princípios negativos
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1.1
οὔτε γὰρ τὴν κίνησιν καὶ τὴν μεταβολὴν ἐν ἄλλῳ γένει θεῖναι δύναιτ' ἄν τις, δῆλόν τε σκοποῦσιν ὡς τιθέασιν (201b.20) αὐτὴν ἔνιοι, ἑτερότητα καὶ ἀνισότητα καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν φάσκοντες εἶναι τὴν κίνησιν·
For one could not even 20 place motion and change in any other class, though it is clear to those who consider [what has been written on the topic] how some place it, asserting motion to be otherness or inequality or non-being.
A causa disso é o movimento parecer indefinido, por não ser um isso, uma qualidade, uma quantidade, etc.
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ὧν οὐδὲν ἀναγκαῖον κινεῖσθαι, οὔτ' ἂν ἕτερα ᾖ οὔτ' ἂν ἄνισα οὔτ' ἂν οὐκ ὄντα· ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἡ μεταβολὴ οὔτ' εἰς ταῦτα οὔτ' ἐκ τούτων μᾶλλόν ἐστιν ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἀντικειμένων. αἴτιον δὲ τοῦ εἰς ταῦτα τιθέναι ὅτι ἀόριστόν 201b.25 τι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡ κίνησις, τῆς δὲ ἑτέρας συστοιχίας αἱ ἀρχαὶ διὰ τὸ στερητικαὶ εἶναι ἀόριστοι· οὔτε γὰρ τόδε οὔτε τοιόνδε οὐδεμία αὐτῶν ἐστιν, [ὅτι] οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων κατηγοριῶν.
But none of these is a necessary condition of being moved, namely that a thing be either other or unequal or not be, nor is change either into these or from these any more than into or from their opposites. But the reason for placing it in these classes is that motion seems to be something indefinite, while a whole array of negative principles seem also to be indefinite, since none of them is a this nor an of-this-kind nor belongs to any of the other ways of attributing being.
A razão da indefinição do movimento é resultado da impossibilidade de identifica-lo com o ato ou com a potência: o movimento é de certa forma um ato, mas incompleto (Met. 1048b 29- 35)
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τοῦ δὲ δοκεῖν ἀόριστον εἶναι τὴν κίνησιν αἴτιον ὅτι οὔτε εἰς δύναμιν τῶν ὄντων οὔτε εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἔστιν θεῖναι αὐτήν· οὔτε 201b.30 γὰρ τὸ δυνατὸν ποσὸν εἶναι κινεῖται ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὔτε τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ποσόν, ἥ τε κίνησις ἐνέργεια μὲν εἶναί τις δοκεῖ, ἀτελὴς δέ·
And the reason motion seems to be indefinite is that one cannot place it as a 30 potency of things or as a being-at-work. For neither the potency to be this-much nor the actively being this-much is necessarily a being-moved; so motion seems to be a certain being-at-work, but incomplete.
O ato é incompleto pois a potência é sempre incompleta (caso contrário, não haveria movimento), por isso é difícil discernir o movimento e por isso ele é associado à privação e ao não-ser
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αἴτιον δ' ὅτι ἀτελὲς τὸ δυνατόν, οὗ ἐστιν ἐνέργεια. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δὴ χαλεπὸν αὐτὴν λαβεῖν τί ἐστιν· ἢ γὰρ εἰς στέρησιν ἀναγκαῖον θεῖναι ἢ εἰς δύναμιν ἢ εἰς 201b.35 ἐνέργειαν ἁπλῆν, τούτων δ' οὐδὲν φαίνεται ἐνδεχόμενον. λείπεται 202a.1 τοίνυν ὁ εἰρημένος τρόπος, ἐνέργειαν μέν τινα εἶναι, τοιαύτην δ' ἐνέργειαν οἵαν εἴπαμεν, χαλεπὴν μὲν ἰδεῖν, ἐνδεχομένην δ' εἶναι.
The reason for this is that the potency, of which it is the [complete] being-at-work, is itself something incomplete. On account of this it is difficult to get hold of what it is. For one must place it as a deprivation, or a potency, or an 202a unqualified being-at-work, but none of these seems admissable. There remains, then, the way stated, that it is a certain being-at-work, a being-at-work of such a kind as we have described, difficult to bring into focus, but possible to be.
A necessidade de contato e a reciprocidade do movimento
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2
202a.3 κινεῖται δὲ καὶ τὸ κινοῦν ὥσπερ εἴρηται πᾶν, τὸ δυνάμει ὂν κινητόν, καὶ οὗ ἡ ἀκινησία ἠρεμία ἐστίν
Everything which causes motion is also moved, as has been said, if it is potentially movable and is something of which the motionlessness is rest.
 
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2.1
(ᾧ γὰρ 202a.5 ἡ κίνησις ὑπάρχει, τούτου ἡ ἀκινησία ἠρεμία).
(For the motionlessness of that to which motion belongs is rest.)
Os entes móveis, quando causam movimento, sofrem eles próprios movimento
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2.2
τὸ γὰρ πρὸς τοῦτο ἐνεργεῖν, ᾗ τοιοῦτον, αὐτὸ τὸ κινεῖν ἐστι· τοῦτο δὲ ποιεῖ θίξει, ὥστε ἅμα καὶ πάσχει·
For to be at work upon the movable as such is to move it, and this a thing does by contact, so that at the same time it is also acted upon.
Nova definição de movimento: movimento é próprio ao ente móvel enquanto móvel, apesar do ‘motor’ também ser movido pelo móvel (devido ao contato)
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2.3
διὸ ἡ κίνησις ἐντελέχεια τοῦ κινητοῦ, ᾗ κινητόν, συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο θίξει τοῦ κινητικοῦ, ὥσθ' ἅμα καὶ πάσχει.
Therefore, motion is the being-at-work-staying-itself of the movable, as movable, and happens to it by contact with what is moving, so that the latter too is acted upon.
Necessidade da forma: os entes que movem, movem na medida em que tem uma forma por meio da qual são em ato
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εἶδος δὲ ἀεὶ οἴσεταί τι τὸ κινοῦν, ἤτοι (202a.10) τό δε ἢ τοιόνδε ἢ τοσόνδε, ὃ ἔσται ἀρχὴ καὶ αἴτιον τῆς κινήσεως, ὅταν κινῇ, οἷον ὁ ἐντελεχείᾳ ἄνθρωπος ποιεῖ ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος ἀνθρώπου ἄνθρωπον.
And what 10 moves will always bear a form, whether a this or an of-this-kind or a this much, which will be a source and cause of its motion whenever it moves. For example, a fully-at-work human being brings about another human being from what is potentially human.
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E a categoria da quantidade?
 
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III.3
 
O motor e o móvel
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Καὶ τὸ ἀπορούμενον δὲ φανερόν, ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡ κίνησις ἐν τῷ κινητῷ·
And the riddle is now cleared up, since motion is in the thing moved.
Movimento é a atualidade do ente móvel (a partir da atividade do motor)
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ἐντελέχεια γάρ ἐστι τούτου [καὶ] ὑπὸ τοῦ κινητικοῦ. 202a.15
For the being-at-work-staying-itself (which the motion is) is of the thing moved, though from the thing causing motion.
E a atividade do motor não é distinta daquela do ente móvel
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καὶ ἡ τοῦ κινητικοῦ δὲ ἐνέργεια οὐκ ἄλλη ἐστίν· δεῖ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι ἐντελέχειαν ἀμφοῖν·
And the being-at-work of the thing causing motion is nothing other than this, for it must be the being-at-work-staying-itself of both.
Pois é a partir de uma mesma atividade que o que tem a potência de mover efetivamente move, e que aquilo que tem a potência de ser movido é efetivamente movido
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κινητικὸν μὲν γάρ ἐστιν τῷ δύνασθαι, κινοῦν δὲ τῷ ἐνεργεῖν, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἐνεργητικὸν τοῦ κινητοῦ,
For a thing is capable of causing motion by its potency, but is moving by its being-at-work, and it is at work upon the thing moved.
Há uma mesma atividade em ambos que pode ser observada sob perspectivas distintas
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ὥστε ὁμοίως μία ἡ ἀμφοῖν ἐνέργεια ὥσπερ τὸ αὐτὸ διάστημα ἓν πρὸς δύο καὶ δύο πρὸς ἕν, καὶ τὸ ἄναντες καὶ τὸ 202a.20 κάταντες·
So the being-at-work of both is one, just as the interval from one to two 20 and from two to one is the same, and the uphill and downhill road.
 
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ταῦτα γὰρ ἓν μέν ἐστιν, ὁ μέντοι λόγος οὐχ εἷς· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ κινοῦντος καὶ κινουμένου.
In these cases, the thing is one, though the meaning is not, and it is likewise with the causing motion and being moved.
 
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202a.21 ἔχει δ' ἀπορίαν λογικήν·
But there is a logical impasse.
 
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ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ ἴσως εἶναί τινα ἐνέργειαν τοῦ ποιητικοῦ καὶ τοῦ παθητικοῦ· τὸ μὲν δὴ ποίησις, τὸ δὲ πάθησις, ἔργον δὲ καὶ τέλος τοῦ μὲν ποίημα, τοῦ δὲ πάθος.
For perhaps it is necessary that there be one being-at-work of the active and one of the passive, since the one is a doing and the other a being-done-to, and the work and end of one is a thing done, and of the other a thing suffered.
 
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202a.25 ἐπεὶ οὖν ἄμφω κινήσεις, εἰ μὲν ἕτεραι, ἐν τίνι;
Since, then, both are motions, if they are distinct, where are they?
 
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ἢ γὰρ ἄμφω ἐν τῷ πάσχοντι καὶ κινουμένῳ, ἢ ἡ μὲν ποίησις ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι, ἡ δὲ πάθησις ἐν τῷ πάσχοντι (εἰ δὲ δεῖ καὶ ταύτην ποίησιν καλεῖν, ὁμώνυμος ἂν εἴη).
For if it is not the case that both are in the thing acted upon and moved, then the being-active is in the one acting and the being-passive in the one acted upon. (And if one must also call this latter "acting," it would be ambiguous.)
 
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ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ τοῦτο, ἡ κίνησις ἐν τῷ κινοῦντι ἔσται (ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐπὶ κινοῦντος 202a.30 καὶ κινουμένου), ὥστ' ἢ πᾶν τὸ κινοῦν κινήσεται, ἢ ἔχον κίνησιν οὐ κινήσεται.
But if this is so, the motion will be in the thing causing movement 30 (for the same description applies to moving and being moved as to acting and being acted upon), so that either everything that causes motion will be moved or a thing having motion will not be moved.
 
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εἰ δ' ἄμφω ἐν τῷ κινουμένῳ καὶ πάσχοντι, καὶ ἡ ποίησις καὶ ἡ πάθησις, καὶ ἡ δίδαξις καὶ ἡ μάθησις δύο οὖσαι ἐν τῷ μανθάνοντι, πρῶτον μὲν ἡ ἐνέργεια ἡ ἑκάστου οὐκ ἐν ἑκάστῳ ὑπάρξει, εἶτα ἄτοπον δύο κινήσεις ἅμα (202a.35) κινεῖσθαι·
But if both are in the thing moved and acted upon, both the acting and the being-passive, and both teaching and learning, though they are two, are in the learner, 202b then, first, the being-at-work of each will not inhere in each, and further, it would be strange to be moved in two motions at the same time.
 
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τίνες γὰρ ἔσονται ἀλλοιώσεις δύο τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ εἰς ἓν εἶδος; ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον. ἀλλὰ μία ἔσται ἡ ἐνέργεια. ἀλλ' (202b.1) ἄλογον δύο ἑτέρων τῷ εἴδει τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ μίαν εἶναι ἐνέργειαν·
What would be the two alterations of one thing changing into one form? It is impossible. So there will be one being-at-work. But it is unreasonable that there be one and the same being-at-work of two things different in kind.
 
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καὶ ἔσται, εἴπερ ἡ δίδαξις καὶ ἡ μάθησις τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἡ ποίησις καὶ ἡ πάθησις, καὶ τὸ διδάσκειν τῷ μανθάνειν τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν τῷ πάσχειν, ὥστε τὸν διδάσκοντα (202b.5) ἀνάγκη ἔσται πάντα μανθάνειν καὶ τὸν ποιοῦντα πάσχειν.
But this will be so if teaching and learning are the same [being-at-work], and acting and being-acted-upon, and to teach is the same as to learn, and to act as to be acted upon, so that the one teaching will have to learn everything, and the one acting be acted upon.
 
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(202b.5) ἢ οὔτε τὸ τὴν ἄλλου ἐνέργειαν ἐν ἑτέρῳ εἶναι ἄτοπον (ἔστι γὰρ ἡ δίδαξις ἐνέργεια τοῦ διδασκαλικοῦ, ἔν τινι μέντοι, καὶ οὐκ ἀποτετμημένη, ἀλλὰ τοῦδε ἐν τῷδε), οὔτε μίαν δυοῖν κωλύει οὐθὲν τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι (μὴ ὡς τῷ εἶναι τὸ αὐτό, ἀλλ' ὡς ὑπάρχει (202b.10) τὸ δυνάμει ὂν πρὸς τὸ ἐνεργοῦν), οὔτ' ἀνάγκη τὸν διδάσκοντα μανθάνειν, οὐδ' εἰ τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν, μὴ μέντοι ὥστε τὸν λόγον εἶναι ἕνα τὸν <τὸ> τί ἦν εἶναι λέγοντα, οἷον ὡς λώπιον καὶ ἱμάτιον, ἀλλ' ὡς ἡ ὁδὸς ἡ Θήβηθεν Ἀθήναζε καὶ ἡ Ἀθήνηθεν εἰς Θήβας, ὥσπερ εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον; οὐ γὰρ (202b.15) ταὐτὰ πάντα ὑπάρχει τοῖς ὁπωσοῦν τοῖς αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ μόνον οἷς τὸ εἶναι τὸ αὐτό.
On the other hand, it is not absurd for the being-at-work of one thing to be in something else. (For teaching is a being-at-work of the one who can teach, but surely it is a being-at-work upon someone, and is not divided, but is of this person, in that one.) Nor does anything prevent one and the same thing from belonging to two things (though not in 10 the sense that the being is the same, but in the way in which what is potentially comes into being in relation to something already at work). Nor is it necessary that the one teaching be learning, not even if the acting and being acted upon are the same (again not in the sense that there is one articulation of what it means to be each, but in the manner of the road from Athens to Thebes and that from Thebes to Athens, the sort of example mentioned earlier). For things are not identical to which the same things belong in some particular way, but only those of which the being is the same.
A atualização de A sobre B e de B sobre A tem definições distintas; além disso, mover e ser movido não é a mesma coisa - apenas o movimento é comum a ambos
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οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' οὐδ' εἰ ἡ δίδαξις τῇ μαθήσει τὸ αὐτό, καὶ τὸ μανθάνειν τῷ διδάσκειν, ὥσπερ οὐδ' εἰ ἡ διάστασις μία τῶν διεστηκότων, καὶ τὸ διίστασθαι ἐνθένθε ἐκεῖσε κἀκεῖθεν δεῦρο ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτό. ὅλως δ' εἰπεῖν οὐδ' ἡ δίδαξις (202b.20) τῇ μαθήσει οὐδ' ἡ ποίησις τῇ παθήσει τὸ αὐτὸ κυρίως, ἀλλ' ᾧ ὑπάρχει ταῦτα, ἡ κίνησις· τὸ γὰρ τοῦδε ἐν τῷδε καὶ τὸ τοῦδε ὑπὸ τοῦδε ἐνέργειαν εἶναι ἕτερον τῷ λόγῳ.
And it is by no means the case that to learn is the same as to teach, not even if the activity of teaching is the same as that of learning, just as the separation from here to there is not one and the same as that from there to here, 20 even though the interval between the things set apart is one. And to speak generally, teaching is not the same as learning in the highest and most proper sense, nor acting the same as being acted upon, but that to which these belong, the motion, is the same. For the being-at-work of this in that, and the being-at-work of this by the action of that, differ in meaning.
Conclusão
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τί μὲν οὖν ἐστιν κίνησις εἴρηται καὶ καθόλου καὶ κατὰ μέρος· οὐ γὰρ ἄδηλον πῶς ὁρισθήσεται τῶν εἰδῶν ἕκαστον (202b.25) αὐτῆς· ἀλλοίωσις μὲν γὰρ ἡ τοῦ ἀλλοιωτοῦ, ᾗ ἀλλοιωτόν, ἐντελέχεια. ἔτι δὲ γνωριμώτερον, ἡ τοῦ δυνάμει ποιητικοῦ καὶ παθητικοῦ, ᾗ τοιοῦτον, ἁπλῶς τε καὶ πάλιν καθ' ἕκαστον, ἢ οἰκοδόμησις ἢ ἰάτρευσις. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ λεχθήσεται τρόπον καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων κινήσεων ἑκάστης.
What motion is, then, has been said, both generally and for particular instances. For it is not unclear how each of the kinds of it will. What motion is, then, has been said, both generally and for particular instances. For it is not unclear how each of the kinds of it will be defined: alteration, for example, is the being-at-work-staying-itself of the alterable as alterable. And still more explicitly, motion is the being-at-work-staying-itself of the potentially-active-or-acted-upon as such, both simply and in each case, such as building or healing. And this will be said in the same way about each of the other motions.